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For over half a decade, civil soci-
ety concerns have been growing 
about the spate of land grabbing 
in low-income countries by an 
unholy alliance of local elites, 
government policies, and trans-
national investors. Land titling is 
increasingly being promoted as 
a way to encourage “responsi-
ble” agricultural investment by 
enhancing vulnerable communi-
ties’ land tenure. The FAO, World 
Bank, and others, in a widely read 
2010 policy paper, suggested that 
“countrywide systematic” land 
registration could help safeguard 
smallholders against the global 
rush for “available” land.1
The devil, however, is in the de-
tails. How, and especially where, 
property rights are formalized has 
a major impact on titling’s ability 
to protect smallholders. Should 
titles be communal or individu-
al? Should they be saleable or 
inalienable? Should they be is-
sued systematically across entire 
Issuing land titles to smallholder farmers has long been embraced as 
a way to promote lending and land markets, but is increasingly being 
reframed as a way to protect smallholders from irresponsible agricultural 
investment. This brief examines the case of Cambodia, where over the 
last decade extensive land titling efforts have occurred alongside a wave 
of large-scale land concessions. The problem, however, is that titling has 
failed to live up to the rhetoric of systematic coverage, and has often 
focused on areas where tenure was already relatively secure. Areas 
outside the titling zone, in contrast, have become formalized de facto 
through the process of granting land concessions to investors. This under-
mines pro-poor development significantly.
The formalization fix? Land titling  
and land concessions in Cambodia
KEY MESSAGES
•  Formal land titling is often 
called upon to enhance small­
holder tenure. But in practice 
it frequently emphasizes other 
priorities, such as credit  access, 
land tax collection, and crea­
tion and regulation of land 
markets. It is essential that  
titling projects acknowledge 
and address these trade­offs.
•  Titling efforts often cover much 
smaller areas than assumed. 
Their locations and extent 
should be made more trans­
parent, and used as a basis for 
public dialogue about how to 
balance competing priorities.
•  In the absence of smallholder­ 
friendly formalization efforts, 
large­scale land concessions 
have played a major role in 
formalizing rural property 
rights in favour of the state. 
Pro­smallholder mechanisms 
for planning, titling, and land 
allocation exist, but they cur­
rently face significant hurdles.
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communities, or only sporadically upon 
request to wealthier landholders? Should 
they focus on towns or farmland? Be pre-
cisely mapped or not? And so on. Each of 
these choices speaks to particular aims. 
Yet the relationship between goals and 
methods is often imperfectly understood.
This brief examines one set of choices – 
location – in Cambodia, a national con-
text where enough data exists to study 
the trade-offs between different ap-
proaches at the sub-national scale. Since 
the 1990s, international donors have sup-
ported “systematic” titling efforts across 
the global South. At first glance, these 
projects seem to target the places where 
they are needed most, namely countries 
in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
under increasing pressure from large-scale 
land deals. But upon closer look, these 
efforts are not as systematic as they ap-
pear. The unevenness of titling, in turn, is 
affording much less protection to small-
holders than might be expected. 
Titling and concessions show a clear 
lack of overlap – by design
Land titling serves many aims, including 
enhancement and regulation of land mar-
kets; improvement of land tax collection; 
facilitation of lending (by collateralizing 
land), and improvement of smallholder 
and community tenure. Although many 
titling programmes aspire to several ob-
jectives simultaneously, the trade-offs 
between them are not always made ob-
vious; tenure enhancement in particular 
often takes a back seat. Frequently the 
trade-offs are masked by a rhetoric of 
achieving multiple aims, and a lack of 
public data makes it hard to assess what 
is actually going on – and where.
Cambodia is an exception: spatially pre-
cise data on both land titling and con-
cessions is publicly available. While the 
reasons might be counterintuitive – the 
country’s major land titling project be-
came much more transparent when its 
funders sought to distance themselves 
from land conflicts in their general pro-
ject areas3 – the results are important. 
When combined with spatial data on land 
concessions collected by the Cambodian 
League for the Promotion and Defence 
of Human Rights  (LICADHO), World Bank 
data shows that land titling and land con-
cessions have overlapped very little (Fig-
ure 1). While the government has recently 
started granting titles to residents within 
putative concession areas – largely out 
of fear of being seen as sympathetic to 
land grabbing in the 2013 elections4 – the 
basic pattern shown in Figure 1 still pre-
vails (Dwyer 2015).
This marked separation of titling and con-
cessions is due to several factors.
Avoidance of “potentially disputed” 
areas: Observers of land titling across 
Southeast Asia have long pointed out that 
projects often expressly avoid areas con-
sidered “contested”.5,6 In the name of ca-
pacity building, Cambodia’s titling project 
initially avoided areas where disputes were 
likely;7 it was launched in densely popu-
lated places where people’s tenure was al-
ready secure, allegedly because it would be 
most likely to succeed there.8 But even as 
capacity improved, titling  efforts continued 
to avoid potentially  contested areas (Adler 
and So 2012).9 
Deference to other (larger) economic 
interests: One reason for titling’s persistent 
avoidance of “potentially contested” areas 
is the perceived need to accommodate 
competing interests. As the geographer 
Robin Biddulph notes, provincial governors 
are the ones who decide where titling ac-
tually takes place within a given province. 
In doing so, they function as what he calls 
“a decentralized safety valve” for making 
strategic choices “on the basis of the sorts 
of vested interests and networks that order 
the economic development of contem-
Figure 1. Land titling and economic land concessions in Cambodia. (Figure by the author using data from LICADHO 
[pers. comm. 2012] and the World Bank [2011]
2
.)
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porary Cambodia”.10 These interests and 
networks comprise Cambodia’s version of 
neo-patrimonialism, a system of rule where-
in well-connected business elites use qua-
si-legal mechanisms to pursue their own 
economic interests. While essentially private 
and often in conflict with small-scale liveli-
hoods, these interests can nonetheless be 
portrayed as development.11 
Internal incentives: Last but certainly 
not least, titling projects often pay their 
employees on the basis of the number of 
titles issued or the area of land covered.12 
This creates strong incentives to choose 
densely occupied and uncontested areas 
– both at the plot and at the communi-
ty scale – where the titling can be done 
quickly.13,14
Other pro-poor formalization schemes 
have been slow to  materialize
In parallel to the individual titling de-
scribed above, several other formalization 
efforts were rolled out in the early 2000s. 
Four of these – communal land titling, 
social land concessions, commune-scale 
land use planning, and the demarcation 
of state land – aimed to protect vulnera-
ble communities’ land access, especially in 
less-populated parts of the country. Results 
have been disappointing.
Communal land titling: In addition to 
individual titling, Cambodia’s 2001 Land 
Law allows for communal land titles. 
But it restricts these to indigenous com-
munities, thus excluding the majority of 
Cambodians (many of whom practise 
communal management, e.g. of pasture 
lands). Moreover, those communities that 
do qualify must navigate a lengthy bu-
reaucratic process to obtain official classi-
fication as indigenous.15 As of late 2014, 
these restrictions had limited the number 
of titles issued to the single digits.16 
Social land concessions: Also introduced 
in the 2001 Land Law, these provide a 
mechanism for granting land to land-
less and land-poor families “to establish 
residences for themselves and/or to de-
velop subsistence cultivation”.17 But as 
with communal titles, results have been 
constrained by a mix of bureaucracy and 
competing priorities. After seven years of 
work, a foreign advisor close to the pro-
cess wrote that “99% of the distributed 
[state] land was handed over in long-term 
leases of up to 99 years to national and 
international investors to the detriment 
of the rural poor, who got only a 1% 
share”.18 
Commune land use planning: This was 
piloted as part of donor-funded efforts 
to promote decentralization and de-con-
centration, and was formalized in a 2009 
prime-ministerial sub-decree. While not 
intended as a form of land allocation or 
tenure formalization, it seeks to docu-
ment existing land uses and, in the pro-
cess, “tie land use planning in with the 
broader commune level planning pro-
cess [and] provide a basis for discussions 
between citizens and various levels of 
government”.19 Unfortunately, it has not 
been widely implemented.
Formalization of state land: The World 
Bank-led titling project mentioned above 
initially included a component aimed at 
formally inventorying state land assets. 
This would have prevented the now-stand-
ard practice of formalizing state landhold-
ings in the act of granting concessions.20 
Unfortunately, this component fell prey to 
the “political-economic context” in which 
the project was operating,21 and was only 
minimally implemented.22 In its absence, 
estimates of state land are likely inflated. 
Many in the policy arena continue to ac-
cept the figure that 80% of Cambodia’s 
countryside is state land, despite signifi-
cant flaws in the data on which this (dec-
ades old) figure is based.23 
Concessions have formalized the 
countryside by default
Because of these shortcomings, many 
hinterland areas have been formalized 
by default via land concessions. This is 
particularly apparent in high-profile con-
cession cases where concessions compete 
with – and often trump – untitled small-
holder land uses (see Box 1). More broadly, 
though, it illustrates the combined failure 
of smallholder titling  efforts and other for-
malization schemes to move more widely 
into the Cambodian countryside. As a re-
sult, the rural hinterland remains largely 
unmapped in terms of its legal ownership, 
and concessions remain the primary vehicle 
for creating geographically specific owner-
ship in many parts of the country.24,25 This 
is hardly the formalization fix that pro-poor 
advocates of land titling had in mind. 
Box 1. Koh Kong sugar  concessions 
One of Cambodia’s most infamous land concessions is a pair of sugar plantations located 
west of the titling zone in southern Koh Kong province. Developed by an influential Cambodi-
an businessman with Thai and Taiwanese associates, these concessions – producing sugar for 
export to Europe under the EU’s “Everything But Arms” trade provision – have attracted at-
tention because of their detrimental impact on local communities. While claimed legally as 
state land, significant parts of the plantation areas had been used by local communities. Their 
use had been carefully documented via the Commune Land Use Planning process (see below). 
While CLUP was not intended to allocate property rights, the evidence it provided – overlaid 
with the black polygons of the sugar project’s concession area – vividly illustrates how “state” 
land is often not empty.
26
Source: CLUP map: Chi Kha Leu Commune, ‘[Village Scale] Commune Land Use Planning map’ (2006).
27
 
Concession polygons extracted from the data set shown in Figure 1.
 
Policy implications of research
Promote spatial transparency to help navigate complex trade-offs
Greater transparency about both land titling and concessions is needed to help 
concerned communities and policymakers navigate important trade-offs. Having 
good data – about where, how, and when titling has occurred – is essential to 
meaningful debates. Similarly, making the concession survey process more transpar-
ent, both by publicly gazetting proposed concession locations and by being clear 
about criteria for available land, could help make concession development efforts 
more compatible with existing smallholder land uses. 
Create public dialogue
As well as working for transparency, governments and multilateral agencies should 
facilitate more inclusive dialogue about the social goals of land titling. Titling efforts 
have long favoured access to credit, tax collection, and the creation and regulation of 
land markets. As tenure enhancement becomes an increasingly significant priority, 
should these other goals be demoted? Should other approaches to tenure – or credit, or 
taxes, or land market regulation – be pursued? These issues demand open and well-in-
formed debate between civil society, policymakers, affected communities, and funders.
28
Focus on areas and people at risk
If titling activities are intended to strengthen tenure, they should focus on areas and 
people at greatest risk. This might require steering pro-tenure interventions like titling 
(whether communal or otherwise) and commune land use planning to areas where 
concessions are tentatively planned, but where detailed surveying has yet to occur.
Extend legal and policy-level tenure protections to untitled land users
Meanwhile, consider affording policy-level protection to landholders who physically 
occupy land, even if they do not have legal title. To avoid conflict, some developers 
now use material possession as a basis for recognizing local entitlements. Making 
this more widespread could help eliminate the perverse incentives of mitigating 
conflict on a concession-by-concession basis.29 
Measure impacts, not titles issued
If meant to enhance tenure, titling campaigns require metrics that accurately reflect 
that aim. “Impact” in such a context would mean safeguarding vulnerable land users’ 
access to resources, and might draw on conflict- rather than area-based indicators. 
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